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Abstract
In this paper we lay the foundations of a formal ontology for
the characterisation of vague concepts sourced from natural
language, applying principles of event calculus and super-
valuation semantics. We focus on a specific set of motion
events and related concepts, motivated by the aim to develop
an automated reasoning system able to detect occurrences of
such events in video scenes. Our goal is to provide a general
methodology for the formalisation of vague concepts, and to
address the issue of vagueness in formal ontologies.
1 Introduction
Automated reasoning on natural language concepts is often
problematic due to vagueness, an issue concerning ambigu-
ities in the meaning of terms. In this paper, we present a
formalism for the characterisation of vague concepts in on-
tologies, with an application to a particular reasoning task.
The motivation for this approach comes from our interest
in vagueness and formal ontologies, and the involvement in
Darpa Mind’s Eye Challenge1, whose goal is to automati-
cally detect temporal occurrences of a specific set of 48 mo-
tion verbs in video scenes, and for which we are developing
an automated logical reasoning system (D’Odorico and Ben-
nett 2012). The core of this system is constituted by an on-
tology formally characterising the meaning of each concept
relevant to our domain. The reasoning process starts with
the grounding of the lower layer of the ontology with in-
formation obtained by pre-processing the video sequences,
continues with the logical inference of mid- and higher-level
predicates and culminates with the inference of predicates
representing event occurrences in the scene.
Sec. 2 to follow provides a brief overview on vagueness
and related work. The main issue our approach is address-
ing is the methodology with which to formulate a formal
definition for the mid- and higher-level concepts in the on-
tology, often constituted by vague terms. For example, how
would one formally define the vague concept near? The for-
malism is outlined in Sec. 3, with Sec 4 illustrating some
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examples of verb models and concept definitions. Finally,
Sec. 5 closes with some considerations about the proposed
approach.
2 Vagueness and Related Work
Vagueness is a phenomenon most ontologies struggle with
when attemtping to formally define concepts sourced from
natural language. Several concept classes are sources of
vagueness, for example spatial prepositions (e.g. near, far,
beside, close. . . ); adjectives (e.g. tall, short, big, small, fast,
slow. . . ); verbs (e.g. approach, chase, exchange. . . ) and
nouns (e.g. group, hill, river. . . ). Vagueness is different from
uncertainty, arising from insufficient or imprecise knowl-
edge, or generality, arising from lack of specificity.
Most of the foundational characterisations on origins and
nature of vagueness can be found among the philosophi-
cal and logic communities (Fine 1975; Williamson 1994;
2003; Keefe and Smith 1997). More recently, interest has
been growing within the computing and geography commu-
nities too (Varzi 2001; Bennett, Mallenby, and Third 2008;
Galton 2009; Cintula et al. 2011). The ongoing debate
has produced different and sometimes conflicting accounts
of vagueness as intrinsic indeterminacy of things in the
world (de re vagueness, (Tye 1990)), indeterminacy of
linguistic expressions (de dicto vagueness, (Lewis 1986;
Varzi 2001)), or indeterminacy of knowledge (epistemic
vagueness, (Williamson 1992; 1994; Sorensen 2001)).
The work presented here is mostly concerned with the in-
determinacy of linguistic expressions. In fact, most concepts
defining event occurrences to be detected by an automatic
reasoning system exhibit indeterminate applicability bound-
aries. For example, given a scene where an object a is mov-
ing towards a location b, detecting an occurrence of the event
“a is arriving at b” involves the non-trivial task of establish-
ing the applicability boundary of the concept ‘arrive’ to the
given situation. One may formalise ‘arrive’ by specifying
its meaning as “a is arriving at b if a is moving towards b,
a is near b and a eventually stops at b”, which in turn in-
volves establishing a precise meaning for ‘moving towards’,
‘near’ and ‘stop’. This simple example shows how quickly
the problem can escalate even on narrow domains.
We adopt a pragmatical approach based on the epistemic
stance (Lawry and Tang 2009), an elaboration on the epis-
temic characterisation of vagueness. This characterisation
argues that there is an objectively correct set of criteria for
precisely determining the applicability of a vague concept,
but this set of criteria is unknown due to the uncertain and in-
consistent meaning of words in natural language. The epis-
temic stance maintains that decision problems regarding as-
sertions can find it useful to assume an epistemic view of
vagueness and thus the existence of a clear dividing line be-
tween concept demarcations. The following types of vague-
ness (Bennett 2005) are the main factors affecting the indi-
viduation of such concept demarcations:
• simple ambiguity – a term has multiple meanings (e.g.
the verb ‘Pass’ may mean “crossing a boundary” but also
“handing an item”);
• sorites or threshold vagueness – the applicability bound-
ary of a concept is blurred and depends on the continuous
variation of some observable properties of the sample to
which the concept applies (e.g. the concept ‘near’ may be
applicable to two objects a and b according to the dis-
tance separating them, for which establishing a threshold
is non-trivial);
• deep ambiguity – there exist several overlapping clusters
of observable properties that may establish an applicabil-
ity boundary for a concept, yet it is unclear as to which
ones are necessary or relevant (e.g. the fact that a is near b
may be defined according to linear distance, time needed
to travel from a to b or some other estimation).
This model of linguistic vagueness — assuming the exis-
tence of precise criteria determining the applicability bound-
ary of concepts according to observable properties of objects
— is suitable to the application of supervaluation semantics
(Fine 1975; Keefe 2008). In this semantics, precise inter-
pretations of vague predicates are expressed by precisifica-
tions. In our ontology, precisifications of vague concepts are
modeled with explicit thresholds linked to observable prop-
erties relevant to the demarcation of the concept applicabil-
ity boundary (see Sec. 3.4).
Despite not necessarily believing in an epistemic nature
of vagueness, we do believe in the practical utility of an ar-
tificial agent behaving as if the epistemic view was correct.
This underlying assumption coupled with a supervaluation-
ist approach has guided the development of the ontology
outlined in the next section.
3 Ontology
Our ontology builds upon Event Calculus (Kowalski and
Sergot 1986; Shanahan 1999) and Versatile Event Logic
(VEL) (Bennett and Galton 2004), formalisms designed to
reason about actions and events within logic. Given an or-
dered set of time points T = (T,<), the most interest-
ing feature of the calculus is the possibility to express that
propositional expression p holds at a particular time point
t ∈ T , through the construct HoldsAt(p, t).
The purpose of our formalism is to describe real world
situations, mainly objects, their properties and event occur-
rences. However, the task of automated event detection in
which this ontology will be employed presents a few pe-
culiar aspects bearing an influence to some of the design
choices outlined in the remainder of this section.
Firstly, a computer system can only operate on a repre-
sentation of the real world, and not on the real world itself.
This observation led us to separate the appearance of things
in the world, stemming from the representation, from their
evidence, stemming from reality. This constitutes the low-
level layer of the ontology, concerned with “what we know
about the world” and is examined in more detail in Sec. 3.2.
Secondly, higher-level concepts that we would like to in-
fer, and representing “what we can understand about the
world”, have different levels of complexity. This influenced
the structuring of the ontology in a mid-level layer, con-
cerned with objects’ description, and a high-level layer, con-
cerned with complex situations such as processes and events.
3.1 Logical Formalism
The vocabulary of our logical language can be specified by
the tuple:
V = 〈T ,O,A,D,M,Q,PT ,F , E ,Σ〉
where:
• T is the set of ordered time points (e.g. T = {t1, t2 . . .});
• O is the set of objects;
• A is the set of appearance-types (Sec.3.2);
• D is the set of evidence-types (Sec. 3.2);
• M is the set of measure-types (Sec. 3.3);
• Q is the set of quality-types (Sec. 3.3);
• PT is the set of precisification thresholds (Sec. 3.4);
• F is the set of fluents (Sec. 3.5);
• E is the set of event-types (Sec. 3.5);
• Σ is the set of event-tokens (Sec. 3.5).
A formula of the typeHoldsAt(p, t) expresses that p holds
at time point t. In the following, this notation will be ab-
breviated to JpK[t]. For some propositions, time-indexing
may not be relevant as they may hold regardless of a spe-
cific time point. These will be simply stated as p, equivalent
to ∀t ∈ T JpK[t].
3.2 Appearances and Evidences
It has been pointed out that a computer system can only look
at a representation of reality, which is what we call appear-
ance. Appearances may result from algorithmic processing
(e.g. a computer vision algorithm processing a video scene)
or manual annotation by human observers of the scene. Dis-
similarities in granularity and precision among different ap-
pearances can be huge; in any case they are always a par-
tial, finite and incomplete representation of the real world
and constitute all that is available for a computer system to
ground the ontology. Thus the appearance represents every-
thing the ontology knows about the world.
The set A of appearance-types represents the domain of
possible appearances. Each appearance-type (p,Op, Dp) ∈
A is a triple where p is the appearance predicate, Op and
Dp are respectively the object and description domain of
p. A particular instance of such appearance-type is ex-
pressed by Ja(p(o, d))K[t], for o ∈ Od and d ∈ Dd. An
example of appearance-type can be the position of an ob-
ject as a point on a two-dimensional discrete grid, formally
(position,O,N×N). The actual appearance describing po-
sition of object o at time t on coordinate (x, y) is given by
Ja(position(o, (x, y)))K[t].
It has been said that an appearance represents everything
the ontology knows about the world. However, some de-
tails about the world missing from the appearance may be
logically inferred on the appearance itself, thus enriching
the representation forming what we call the evidence. The
set of evidence-types D represents the domain of such evi-
dences, and has the same structure of A. Given evidence-
type (p,Od, Dd) ∈ D, a particular evidence is expressed by
Jd(p(o, d))K[t] for o ∈ Od and d ∈ Dd.
An example is given by occlusion: for instance, a person
walking in space and passing behind an object. A set of ap-
pearances returned by an average tracking algorithm would
represent the person’s position as a bounding box at each
time instant, excluding the instants in which the person is
behind the object. The inferrable evidence from such an ap-
pearance is constituted by the information standing between
the real world and the appearance. Even a very sophisti-
cated ontology is unlikely to infer precise details such as the
person’s shape, posture and positioning. However, it is con-
ceivable that an ontology may successfully infer the bound-
ing boxes corresponding to the person’s position whilst oc-
cluded by the wall, or infer the position of the person’s hands
and feet from the bounding box (and other details useful for
specific event occurrences).
We call this layer of the ontology Theory of Appearances
whose aim, as in the example above, is to augment the
knowledge given by appearances. A theory may also dis-
card ‘wrong’ appearances, for example spurious bounding
boxes resulting from tracking algorithms.
3.3 Measures and Qualities
The theory of appearances described above is made up of
low-level predicates providing precise, concrete and mostly
quantitative information about objects. Measures and qual-
ities populate the mid-level layer of the ontology, bridging
the gap between quantitative/precise evidences and qualita-
tive/vague abstractions.
A measure is a simple quantitative abstraction, generally
inferred from evidences. A measure-type (p,Op,Mp) ∈ M
is a triple wherem is the measure predicate relating objects
in Op with measure-values in Mp. Given t ∈ T , o ∈ Op
and v ∈ Mp, a particular instance of such a measure-type is
expressed by Jm(p(o, v))K[t] as in the examples below.
• (pos,O,R × R): position of an object as coordinate on
a grid assuming that, for each object, its position is either
given as evidence-type (pos,O,N × N) ∈ D or can be
calculated as centroid of a bounding box (evidence-type
(bbox ,O,N4) ∈ D
Jm(pos(o, (x, y)))K[t] ≡ Jd(pos(o, (x, y)))K[t] ∨
∨
[
Jd(bbox (o, (bx, by, bw, bh)))K[t] ∧
∧ x =
bx + bw
2
∧ y =
by + bh
2
] (1)
• (dist ,O ×O,R): distance between objects o1, o2 ∈ O
Jm(dist((o1, o2), d))K[t] ≡ Jm(pos(o1, (x1, y1)))K[t] ∧
∧ Jm(pos(o2, (x2, y2)))K[t] ∧ d = edist((x1, y1), (x2, y2))
(2)
where edist : R2 × R2 → R is a function calculating the
euclidean distance between two points.
A quality is a richer, qualitative and often vague abstrac-
tion inferred from evidences, measures and other qualities.
A quality-type (p,Op, Qp) ∈ Q is a triple where p is the
quality predicate relating objects in Op with quality-values
in Qp. Given t ∈ T , o ∈ Op and v ∈ Qp, a particulare
instance of such quality-type is expressed by Jq(p(o, v))K[t].
Below there are some examples of quality-types that are rel-
evant to our domain:
• Type of an object:
(type,O, {person, car, box, other});
• Size of an object:
(size,O, {pocketSize, carrySize,manSize, largeSize});
• Speed of an object:
(speed ,O, {slow,walkSpeed, runningSpeed, fast});
• Relative positioning of one object with respect to another:
(relPosition,O ×O, {left, right, over, under});
• Topological relation between two objects (RCC-8 relation
set (Randell, Cui, and Cohn 1992)):
(rccRel ,O ×O, {DC,EC,PO,EQ,
TPP,NTPP,TPP−1,NTPP−1})
• Proximity of two objects:
(proximity ,O ×O, {near, far, veryFar}).
Contrary to most measures in M, the ambiguous nature
of qualities makes their formalisation difficult. This problem
is addressed by precisifications, introduced below.
3.4 Precisifications
A formal method to establish whether a vague concept holds
can be obtained through the ideas in Supervaluation Seman-
tics (Fine 1975; Keefe 2008). In this theory, a formula may
admit multiple models, each obtainable via an assignment
of referents to terms and truth-values to predicates. Such an
assignment is called a precisification, and allows to obtain
a precise interpretation of a vague term. This approach pre-
serves classical logic inference rules, hence it is preferred
over multi-valued logics such as Fuzzy Logic (Zadeh 1975)
for our task of ontology reasoning.
Supervaluation Semantics and the epistemic stance lead
us to Standpoint semantics (Bennett 2011), an elaboration
of supervaluation semantics where the precisification is ex-
plicitly embedded in the language syntax. Specifically, the
precise criteria governing the extension of a concept’s ap-
plicability boundary are modeled in terms of applicability
thresholds for one or more observable properties.
The set of precisification thresholds PT is constituted by
couples (t, Vt), where Vt is the range of admissible values
for threshold t. A precisification P is an assignments of val-
ues to precisification thresholds, i.e. P ⊆ {(t, vt) | (t, Vt) ∈
PT ∧ vt ∈ Vt} (assuming ∄ (t, v1), (t, v2) ∈ P ∧ v1 6= v2).
Precisifications are explicited in the language with the
syntax demonstrated in the following example. The vague
concept o1 is near o2 can be made precise by specifying a
threshold on an observable property, such as the linear dis-
tance between a and b. We can define the proximity qual-
ity with value ‘near’ by introducing precisification threshold
(minNear , v) ∈ PT and adding precisification P as param-
eter to the definition:
Jq[P ](proximity((o1, o2), near))K[t] ≡
∃(minNear , δ) ∈ P ∧ Jm(dist((o1, o2), d))K[t] ∧ d < δ
(3)
The simple definition above states that the proximity qual-
ity near holds between objects o1 and o2 if their distance
measure is smaller than theminNear threshold specified by
precisification P .
3.5 Fluents, Processes and Events
We distinguish between two types of time-dependent for-
mal expressions: propositional expressions whose validity
can be stated over time (fluents) and expressions referring to
temporal entities occurring over some interval (events).
A fluent’s truth-value may be established at single time
points. Fluents describe either a state that may hold or not
hold, or a process that may be active or inactive at each
time point. Given JfK[t], we define HoldsOver(f, [t1, t2])
and HoldsOn(f, [t1, t2]) to express that f holds over the in-
terval [t1, t2]:
HoldsOver(f, [t1, t2]) ≡ ∀ t
[
(t1 ≤ t ≤ t2)→ JfK[t]
]
(4)
HoldsOn(f, [t1, t2]) ≡ HoldsOver(f, [t1, t2]) ∧
∧ ∃ t′1
[
t
′
1 < t1 ∧ ∀ t
′
[
t
′
1 < t
′
< t1 → ¬JfK[t′]
]]
∧
∧ ∃ t′2
[
t2 < t
′
2 ∧ ∀ t
′
[
t2 < t
′
< t
′
2 → ¬JfK[t′]
]] (5)
If HoldsOver(f, [t1, t2]) is true for some t1, t2, from (4)
it follows that HoldsOver(f, [ti, tj ]) is also true, for every
t1 < ti < tj < t2. Conversely, HoldsOn(f, [t1, t2]) holds
only on the greatest continuous temporal interval over which
f is true, i.e. there are no t′1, t
′
2 such that t
′
1 < t1, t2 < t
′
2 and
HoldsOn(f, [t′1, t
′
2]). In the formulae to follow, the notation
HoldsOn(f, [t1, t2]) will be shortened in JfK[t1,t2].
An event represents a complex action and we distinguish
between event-types and event-tokens (Bennett and Galton
2004). An event-type e ∈ E is associated with a set
of episodes of a particular event, for example: ‘John ap-
proaches Mary’, formalised as Approach(John,Mary). An
event-token σ ∈ Σ constitutes an occurrence of a particular
event-type over a temporal interval. To express occurrence
of event type e ∈ E over time interval i ∈ I we introduce
the construct Occurs(e, i). For clarity of notation in the for-
mulae to follow, event-types are capitalised as in Approach.
4 Verb Models
This section illustrates some sample verb models applying
the principles outlined in the previous section. Definitions in
this ontology are not intended as exhaustive semantic char-
acterisations of concepts, such as the ones that would be pro-
duced following a sistematic linguistic analysis. Our formal-
isation needs to strike a compromise between the complex-
ity of meaning, the practical task of detecting occurrences
of such concepts on a coarse and imprecise representation
of the real world and the implementability of these defini-
tions in Prolog, the logic-programming language of our au-
tomated reasoning system. For this reason, we cannot for-
mulate very complex definitions, as they would either be too
difficult to disambiguate, or impractical to break down and
ground on the Theory of Appearances.
The formalisations to follow are intended as an illustration
on how to apply such methodology. Most definitions are pa-
rameterised with precisification thresholds; a recurring one
is the detection window Tw. Defining whether JfK[t] holds
often involves examining whether other predicates hold at
instants preceding and/or following t. Threshold Tw allows
to quantify and discretise such span.
4.1 Verbs of Proximity
A few verbs in our set seem to involve the definition of the
notion of proximity, notably Approach and Arrive/Leave.
Given two objects o1, o2 ∈ O, the fact that o1 is ap-
proaching o2 can be defined by specifying that o1 has to
be both getting closer and moving towards o2. The flu-
ent getCloserTo holds true at time t if, given precisification
thresholds Tw and Td, the distance between objects o1 and
o2 decreases of at least Td over detection window of length
Tw. The definition below uses the measure (dist ,O×O,R)
defined in (2):
JgetCloserTo[P ](o1, o2)K[t] ≡ ∃(Tw, w), (Td, d) ∈ P
∃ts, te, ds, de[t− ts = te − t = w ∧ ds − de > d ∧
∧ Jm(dist((o1, o2), ds))K[ts] ∧ Jm(dist((o1, o2), de))K[te]
(6)
The fluent moveTowards considers whether object o1 is
heading in the direction of o2 irrespective of o2’s move-
ments (measure (pos,O,R2) in the definition below defined
in (1)):
JmoveTowards[P ](o1, o2)K[t] ≡ ∃(Tw, w), (Td, d) ∈ P
∃ts, te, p1s, p2s, p1e[t− ts = te − t = w ∧
∧ Jm(pos(o1, p1s))K[ts] ∧ Jm(pos(o2, p2s))K[ts] ∧
∧ Jm(pos(o1, p1e))K[te] ∧
∧ edist(p1s, p2s)− edist(p1e, p2s) > d
(7)
It is now possible to define the event Approach:
Occurs(Approach[P ](o1, o2), [t1, t2]) ≡
JgetCloserTo[P ][Tw, Td](o1, o2)K[t1,t2] ∧
∧ JmoveTowards[P ][Tw, Td](o1, o2)K[t1,t2]]
(8)
The above definitions refer to the rather simple concepts
of distance and position. Depending on the data grounding
the ontology, one could employ a finer characterisation tak-
ing into account, for example, the type of objects involved,
the terrain surrounding them, the different paths one object
could take, the presence of constraints blocking a particular
path, the effort required for each path etc.
The verb Arrive and its opposite Leave appear harder to
formalise. Events described by verbs of this kind are punc-
tual or near-punctual events, i.e. their occurrences gener-
ally span a small temporal interval whose duration and pre-
cise individuation is questionable. Also, their meaning sug-
gests a directional motion and the existence of a destina-
tion (Arrive) or a location the object is moving away from
(Leave); the manner of motion is not specified but is often
dependent on the type of objects involved (Levin 1993). A
simple example is a train arriving at a station. Most formal-
isations would agree on the fact that the interval for such
an event occurrence would terminate on the instant the train
stops at the platform, but disagree over the starting instant.
A possibility is to establish a boundary around the destina-
tion the verb refers to (the spatial object ‘station’), and for-
malise Arrive as starting on the instant the train crosses the
boundary, such as in the following definition (o2 is a generic
object, representing an actual spatial object or a spatial area):
Occurs(Arrive[P ](o1, o2), [ts, te]) ≡ ∃t1, t2, t3, B
∃(Tw, w), (Td, d), (Tb, b) ∈ P [t1 < ts < t2 < te ∧
∧ Jm[P ](bdry(o2, B))K[t1,te] ∧
∧ JmoveTowards[P ](o1, B)K[t1,ts] ∧
∧ Occurs(Enter(o1, B), [ts, t2]) ∧ Occurs(Stop(o1), [t3, te])
(9)
The above definition introduces a number of ambigu-
ous sub-concepts to be formalise. Definition of measure
Jm(bdry(o,B)K[t], which holds if B is an area represent-
ing the boundary of object o at time t, is debatable. In
general, concrete/atomic objects show precise boundaries
(e.g. people, vehicles, small items), whilst abstract/complex
objects show vague boundaries (e.g. cities, stations), whose
ambiguity depends on the object’s nature and also on the sit-
uation and event considered. A suitable boundary given the
task of establishing the starting point of the event “train ar-
riving at station”, could be, for instance, the line past which a
train approaching the station can be seen from the platform
(but there may be many platforms, with different fields of
view, etc.). However, if a different instance of Arrive is con-
sidered, e.g. a person arriving at a station, it is likely that an-
other set of criteria is more appropriate for individuating the
station boundary, e.g. a particular distance from the station
entrance. Most practical, usable definitions will establish b
as a crisp boundary according to precisification threshold Tb.
The verb Enter is vague too; a possible interpretation may
define an occurrence of Enter as starting when the front of
the train is touching the boundary, and finishing when the en-
tire train has crossed the boundary, but other interpretations
may be acceptable. The verb Stop is another vague punc-
tual or near-punctual event with very limited duration, span-
ning the interval immediately preceding the instant in which
motion ceases. Its ambiguity is mostly due to the difficulty
of determining such interval. Formalising Stop would re-
quire establishing some individuation criteria for the interval
probably precisified by a threshold (for example monotonic
deceleration).
4.2 Topology
The meaning of verbs Enter and its opposite Exit can be
modeled in terms of the changes in the topological relations
holding between the event participants. Given the quality
rccRel (Sec. 3.3) expressing the topological relations of the
RCC-8 calculus (Randell, Cui, and Cohn 1992), a formali-
sation of the occurrence of event Enter(o1, o2) over interval
[ts, te] is given as:
Occurs(Enter[P ](o1, o2), [ts, te]) ≡
∃t1, t2, t3[t1 < ts < t2 < te < t3 ∧
∧ Jq[P ](rccRel((o1, o2),DC))K[t1,ts] ∧
∧ Jq[P ](rccRel((o1, o2),EC))K[ts,t2] ∧
∧ Jq[P ](rccRel((o1, o2),PO))K[t2,te] ∧
∧ Jq[P ](rccRel((o1, o2),TPP))K[te,t3]]
(10)
The quality q(rccRel((o1, o2),DC)) holds if o1 and o2
are topologically disconnected. The following formalisation
slightly modifies the original RCC-8 formulation by intro-
ducing threshold TDC representing the minimum amount of
separation between two boundaries to be considered discon-
nected:
Jq[P ](rccRel((o1, o2),DC))K[t] ≡ ∃B1, B2, I1, I2, d
∃(TDC , δ), (Tb, b) ∈ P [ Jm[P ](bdry(o1, B1))K[t] ∧
∧ Jm[P ](bdry(o2, B2))K[t] ∧ Jm[P ](int(o1, I1))K[t] ∧
∧ Jm[P ](int(o2, I2))K[t] ∧ I1 ∩ I2 = ∅ ∧B1 ∩B2 = ∅ ∧
∧ Jm(dist((B1, B2), d))K[t] ∧ d > δ]
(11)
The measures m[P ](bdry(o,B)) and m[P ](int(o, I)) hold
true if B and I are sets of points representing respectively
the boundary and the interior of object o, with threshold
(Tb, b) precisifying vague boundaries/interiors. The mea-
sure m(dist((B1, B2), d)) holds true if d is the distance be-
tween the two boundaries B1 and B2. There may be several
possible formalisations of this measure; one appropriate to
the disconnection relation would hold for d being the min-
imum distance between any pair of points belonging to the
two boundaries.
The quality q(rccRel((o1, o2),EC)) holds if o1 and o2
are externally connected. RCC-8 specifies that two spatial
regions are in such a topological relation only if they share
a common boundary point and no interior points. The fol-
lowing definition allows for a small degree of separation or
overlap between the regions (thresholds TDC and TEC):
Jq[P ](rccRel((o1, o2),EC))K[t]≡∃B1, B2, I1, I2, d ∃(TDC , δ),
(TEC , δ
′), (Tb, b) ∈ P [ Jm[P ](bdry(o1, B1))K[t] ∧
∧ Jm[P ](bdry(o2, B2))K[t] ∧ Jm[P ](int(o1, I1))K[t] ∧
∧ Jm[P ](int(o2, I2))K[t] ∧
∧ [ [I1 ∩ I2 = ∅ ∧B1 ∩B2 = ∅ ∧ Jm(dist((B1, B2), d))K[t]
∧ d < δ] ∨ [I1 ∩ I2 = ∅ ∧B1 ∩B2 6= ∅] ∨
∨ [I1 ∩ I2 = I 6= ∅ ∧B1 ∩B2 6= ∅ ∧ |I| < δ
′] ]]
(12)
The above definition distinguishes three possible configu-
rations of external connection by means of a disjuntion, re-
spectively: 1) o1 and o2 are actually disconnected but ex-
tremely close to each other; 2) o1 and o2 are truly externally
connected; 3) o1 and o2 are actually partially overlapping,
but the amount |I| of points in the intersection of their inte-
rior parts is smaller than threshold TEC .
A similar methodology can be followed to formalise the
remaining RCC relations. The above formalisation is so
far incomplete, as it requires the definition of sub-concepts
boundary, interior and intersection. It is also open to further
specifications, for example the minimum distance for dis-
connection (threshold TDC) and the maximum overlap for
external connection (threshold TEC) may be made propor-
tional to the size of the two objects.
4.3 Contact
This category comprises generic verbs such as Touch, Hold
and specific characterisations of contact motions such asHit,
PickUp, Carry.
The temporal nature of Touch is disputable: one interpre-
tation regards it as a state, i.e. the event-type Touch(o1, o2)
occurs on any interval where o1 and o2 are in contact, an-
other interpretation regards it as a punctual or near-punctual
event, such that the above event-type holds on a small tem-
poral interval starting immediately before o1 comes into
contact with o2, and terminates once movement or contact
ceases (with several interpretations demarcating such inter-
val differently). A simple definition based on the topological
relations in (11) and (12) is the following:
Occurs(Touch[P ](o1, o2), [ts, te]) ≡ ∃ t1, t2, t3
[t1 < ts < t2 < te ∧ ts < t3 < te ∧
∧ Jq[P ](rccRel((o1, o2),DC)K[t1] ∧
∧ Jq[P ](rccRel((o1, o2),EC))K[t2] ∧
∧ [Occurs(Stop(o1), [t3, te]) ∨
∨ Jq[P ](rccRel((o1, o2),DC))K[te]] ]
(13)
The verb Hit is generally a specialised occurrence of Touch
with a movement that could be described as fast, sud-
den, forceful and possibly involving specific contact parts.
Whilst it is conceivable to extend definition in Eq 13 to spec-
ify speed of objects or contact parts, the characterisation of
force constitutes a greater challenge.
The verb PickUp is very specific, as it generally refers to
the event starting with person o1 reaching for object o2 of
small-to-medium size with a particular body part and end-
ing with the person holding the object. Formalising PickUp
hence requires the formalisation of Hold, Reach and gen-
erally requires the identification of the position of the hands
attached to a person. It is often the case that this position has
to be inferred in the Theory of Appearances (Sec. 3.2), as it
is a too fine-grained detail for most object representations.
4.4 Structured events
This latter category comprises most events that can be char-
acterised as an extended sequence of more specific events.
For example, given objects o1, o2 of type person and a
generic object o3, the event Give(o1, o2, o3) occurs on the
temporal interval corresponding to an occurrence of the se-
quence in which o1 has or holds o3, o1 moves o3 towards o2,
o2 reaches for o3 and eventually o2 has or holds o3.
Another example is the verb Exchange, which also ex-
hibits multiple meanings. One possible characterisation of
Exchange is given by a sequence in which two objects of
type person exchange position. Another characterisation is
given by the sequence in which two objects of type person
exchange one or two objects, likely to result in an interleav-
ing of Give and Receive occurrences.
5 Conclusion
The sample verb models in the previous section show the
complexity of our main task of defining complex vague con-
cepts from natural language in a formal ontology. The at-
tempt of defining even one motion verb often unfolds a va-
riety of sub-concepts, interpretations and ambiguities. This
makes testing the validity of our approach in a practical im-
plementation rather difficult.
We have managed to test part of the methodology and for-
malism exposed so far in ProVision, our Prolog-based au-
tomated reasoning system for event detection. ProVision
grounds the ontology on the representation of a video scene
(annotation) and, via logical inferences, produces a list of
predicates representing event occurrences in the scene. In
our tests, annotations are text files produced by human ob-
servers containing the position of two-dimensional rectan-
gular bounding boxes for each object detected in the scene
and each video frame. Tests have been carried out on a set
of 1302 vignettes for the definitions of verbs Approach and
Hold with encouraging results (see (D’Odorico and Bennett
2012) for implementation and result details).
Looking at the development of the ontology and at the ex-
perimental results, we can identify several issues affecting
the accomplishment of our event detection task. Firstly, mo-
tion verbs concept definitions exhibit a complexity that can
escalate quickly. Secondly, the applicability thresholds in-
troduced to disambiguate vague concepts lead to the issue
of designing an effective mechanism for establishing appro-
priate threshold values. Ideally, we would imagine to au-
tomatically infer threshold values given type of objects and
contextual information.
This leads us to another prominent issue, which consists
in the limitations of the data available to us so far. The rep-
resentation of objects as simple rectangular bounding boxes
cannot provide enough evidence for the detection of verbs
with very specific meanings. The formalisation of concepts
within the ontology has to watch out for the risk of specify-
ing too many detailed semantic characteristics of concepts,
manifestations of which may be too challenging to detect
on the data available to us. This problem may be alleviated
by further development of the theory of appearances. For
example, we could imagine to extract three-dimensional co-
ordinates, detect occlusion or attempt to correct error and
noise.
There are a number of other approaches to event detec-
tion tasks through Machine Learning and Inductive Logic
Programming (Dubba, Cohn, and Hogg 2010; Dubba 2012;
Sridhar, Cohn, and Hogg 2010). Given the very particular
nature of the events to be recognised in this task, we believe
our approach’s main strength is to potentially provide for a
greater specification of each verb’s semantic characteristics,
which may not be completely understood by learning tech-
niques. In fact, the characterisations within our ontology
can be easily augmented by integrating further or different
concept definitions suited to a particular task. This approach
and methodology also have the potential to be generalised to
other domains and automated reasoning tasks on qualitative,
vague concepts.
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